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This	  paper	  revisits	  a	  cognitive	  debate	  concerning	  social	  judgment	  and	  the	  measurement	  of	  attitudes.	  
Whilst	   use	   of	   the	   Likert	   scale	   is	   pervasive	   in	   social	   research,	   this	   paper	   demonstrates	   that	   this	  
method	  fails	  to	  address	  a	  critical	  psychological	  operation	  in	  social	  judgment,	  that	  of	  interacting	  with	  
an	  alternative	  proposal	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  another.	  This	  paper	  reports	  a	  study	  undertaken	  with	  
students	  at	   the	  University	  of	  Malta	  (N=247)	  concerning	  the	   issue	  of	  revision	  of	   the	  student	  stipend	  
system.	  Student	  attitudes	  regarding	  this	  issue	  were	  highly	  unfavourable	  to	  proposals	  suggesting	  the	  
curbing	   of	   stipends.	  We	   hypothesized	   that	   strongly	   held	   attitudes	   as	  well	   as	   high	   ego-­‐relatedness	  
would	   be	   associated	   with	   closed-­‐mindedness,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   explicit	   rejection	   of	   alternative	  
proposals.	   Our	   hypotheses	   were	   refuted	   by	   the	   data.	   The	   findings	   demonstrate	   that	   students	   are	  
mostly	  open-­‐minded	  about	   alternative	  proposals	   and	  open	   to	  dialogue.	  The	   study	   shows	   that	  high	  
ego-­‐relatedness	   and	   strongly	   held	   attitudes	   do	   not	   short-­‐circuit	   cognition	   into	   closed-­‐mindedness	  




A	  long-­‐standing	  interest	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  concerns	  the	  understanding	  and	  measurement	  
of	  subjective	  evaluations	  of	  social	  stimuli.	  Such	   interest	  stems	   from	  the	  ability	   to	  ascertain	  
how	  favourably	  disposed	  individuals	  might	  be	  towards	  some	  social	  object	  or	  event.	  Typically	  
measured	   as	   attitudes,	   these	   dispositions	   characteristically	   involve	   a	   process	   of	   judging	  
encountered	   alternatives	   according	   to	   subjective	   standards	   (Eiser,	   1990).	   The	   concern	  
featured	   very	   prominently	   in	   the	   sixties	   and	   seventies,	   as	   scholars	   sought	   to	   overcome	  
cumbersome	  measurement	   procedures	   that	  were	   circumscribed	   by	   context	   (see	   Fishbein,	  
1967).	   The	   Likert	  measure	   has	   had	   an	   unparalleled	   influence	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   since,	  
notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	   according	   to	   its	   proponent	   (Likert,	   1967),	   persons	   with	  
different	   points	   of	   view	   ought	   to	   respond	   to	   an	   attitude	   stimulus	   differentially.	   This,	   as	  
Thurstone	  (1967)	  notes,	  is	  hardly	  the	  case,	  as	  two	  individuals	  could	  be	  attributed	  the	  same	  
attitude	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  evaluative	  articulation	  of	  it,	  despite	  differences	  in	  their	  outlooks	  or	  
in	  their	  choices	  of	  action.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  Likert	  (1967)	  himself,	  sensitive	  to	  these	  contextual	  demands,	  argued	  that	  his	  scales	  
required	   standardisation	   for	   particular	   cultural	   groups,	   and	   that	   scales	   devised	   for	   one	  
group	  should	  not	  be	  thus	  utilised	  for	  another,	  the	  measurement	  of	  attitudes	  on	  five-­‐point	  or	  
seven-­‐point	  Likert	  scales	  ranging	  from	  strongly	  agree	  to	  strongly	  disagree	  with	  a	  presented	  
stimulus	  has	  become	  a	  universal	  and	  seemingly	  culture-­‐proof	  method	  for	  the	  measurement	  
of	  attitudes.	  The	  global	  application	  of	  the	  Likert	  scale	  is	  sustained	  not	  least	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  attitude,	  which	  has	   for	  a	   long	  time	  been	  better	  measured	  than	  defined	  (Allport,	  1967),	  
has	  become	  synonymous	  with	  evaluative	  expressions	  individuals	  make	  regarding	  elements	  
in	   their	   environment	   (Aronson,	  Wilson,	  &	  Akert,	   2005).	  Whilst	   attitudes	   can	   be	   cognitive,	  
affective,	  or	  behavioural	   in	   their	  origin,	   their	   expression	   is	   characteristically	  evaluative.	   In	  
aggregate,	  such	  attitude	  measures	  are	  held	  to	  constitute	  public	  opinion	  for	  a	  certain	  group	  of	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people	   (Shamir	  &	   Shamir,	   2000).	   Indeed,	   the	   popularity	   of	   the	   Likert	   scale	   can	   largely	   be	  
attributed	   to	   its	   pragmatic	   utility	   in	  measuring	  public	   opinion	   (Fraser,	   1994).	   The	  bottom	  
line	  measure	  of	  public	  opinion	  is	  represented	  by	  aggregate	  shifts	  in	  the	  mean	  of	  percentage	  
agreement	  with	  certain	  attitudes	  over	  an	  entire	  population	  (Himmelweit,	  1990).	  	  
	  
Arguably,	   the	  measurement	  of	   individual	   orientations	   to	   elements	   in	   the	   environment	  has	  
been	  much	  refined	  through	  the	  application	  of	  advanced	  statistical	  procedures	  (Fraser,	  1994;	  
but	  see	  Wagoner	  &	  Valsiner,	  2005,	  and	  Toomela	  &	  Valsiner,	  2010,	  for	  a	  different	  appraisal).	  
Much	  of	  these	  developments,	  however,	  retain	  the	  original	  Likert	  scale	  as	  the	  primary	  datum,	  
and	   proceed	   to	   extract	   from	   this	  measure,	   through	   statistical	   operations,	   latent	   variables,	  
such	   as	   factors	   or	   components,	   that	   are	   held	   to	   account	   for	   observable	   differences	   in	   the	  
psychological	  variables	  manifest	  in	  a	  population.	  	  
	  
In	   this	  paper,	  we	  do	  not	   take	   issue	  with	   the	  use	  of	   these	  procedures.	  However,	   in	   spite	  of	  
these	  statistical	  refinements,	  this	  paper	  argues	  that	  in	  adopting	  an	  exclusive	  data	  gathering	  
procedure	   such	   as	   the	   Likert	   scale,	   qualitative	   distinctions	   between	   mental	   outlooks	   are	  
essentially	   overlooked.	  We	   argue	   that	   even	   if	   individuals	   report	   the	   same	   evaluation	   of	   a	  
social	   stimulus	  on	  a	  standard	  attitude	  measure,	   their	  mental	  outlooks	  could	  be	  marked	  by	  
underlying	   differences	   in	   their	   cognitive	   organization.	   Wagoner	   &	   Valsiner	   (2005)	   have	  
alerted	  psychologists	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  rating	  tasks	  assume	  a	  ‘single	  interpretational	  trajectory’	  
that	  is	  only	  possible	  if	  we	  assume	  subjects	  to	  have	  an	  immediate,	  unitary	  and	  accurate	  access	  
to	   their	   mental	   states,	   and	   that	   these	   are	   quantifiable.	   They	   go	   on	   to	   argue	   that	   these	  
assumptions	   are	   untenable.	   For	   instance,	   two	   individuals	   reporting	   a	   similar	   attitude	   (e.g.	  
strongly	  agree)	  could	  be	  differentially	  predisposed	  to	  entertain	  an	  alternative	  view.	  Whilst	  
attitude	   research	   typically	  makes	   the	   assumption	   that	   a	   strongly	   held	   attitude	   is	   to	   some	  
degree	  resistant	  to	  alternatives	  (Eagly	  &	  Chaiken,	  1993),	  this	  need	  not	  be	  the	  case	  when	  the	  
attitude	  is	  underpinned	  by	  an	  open-­‐minded	  point	  of	  view.	  	  
	  
In	   this	   paper,	  we	   report	   a	   study	   undertaken	   in	  Malta	   concerning	   a	   proposal	   to	   revise	   the	  
student	  stipend	  system	  in	  higher	  education.	  We	  demonstrate	  that,	  whilst	  students’	  attitudes	  
towards	  this	  issue	  are	  typically	  strongly	  held,	  many	  students	  report	  an	  open-­‐minded	  point	  of	  
view	  that	  is	  open	  to	  the	  consideration	  of	  alternatives.	  Public	  opinion	  research	  typically	  holds	  
that	   individuals	   reporting	   a	  neutral	   (i.e.	   neither	   agree/nor	  disagree)	   attitude,	  unlike	   those	  
who	  adopt	  a	  clear	  stand	  towards	  the	  issue,	  can	  be	  swayed	  to	  a	  favourable	  or	  unfavourable	  
position	  through	  persuasion	  and	  social	  influence	  (Eagly	  &	  Chaiken,	  1993;	  Sammut	  &	  Bauer,	  
2011).	  We	  argue,	  however,	   that	  such	  a	  conclusion	   is	  unwarranted	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   this	  
dynamic	   is	   better	   measured	   in	   the	   categorization	   of	   points	   of	   view.	   In	   essence,	   we	  
demonstrate	   that	   the	  mere	  measurement	   of	   attitudes	   in	   the	   study	   of	   social	   issues,	   that	   is	  
measuring	  percentage	   agreement	  or	  disagreement	  with	  presented	   stimuli	   in	   a	  population,	  
overlooks	   the	   relative	   propensity	   to	   relate	   with	   an	   alternative	   perspective.	   We	   therefore	  
conclude	   that	   attitude	   research	   may	   benefit	   from	   an	   added	   concern	   with	   this	   variable,	  
insofar	  as	  such	  research	  aims	  at	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  and	  measurement	  of	  the	  degrees	  to	  




A	   different	   line	   of	   research	   that	   concerned	   itself	   with	   similar	   evaluative	   processes	   that	  
inhere	  in	  attitude	  measurement	  is	  that	  of	  social	  judgment.	  This	  line	  of	  research,	  by	  contrast,	  
has	  focused	  on	  perspectives	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  subject	  to	  certain	  variable	  properties.	  Upshaw	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(1965),	   for	   instance,	   argued	   that	   perspectives	   can	   be	   broad	   or	   narrow	   depending	   on	  
whether	  they	  incorporate	  an	  unfamiliar	  alternative	  within	  their	  original	  outlook.	  Pettigrew	  
(1959)	   similarly	   reported	   three	   variations	   in	   the	   category	  width	   of	   perspectives:	   subjects	  
tended	   to	   be	   consistently	   (a)	   broad,	   (b)	  medium,	   or	   (c)	   narrow	   in	   their	   evaluations.	   In	   a	  
corollary	  theory	  of	  social	  judgment,	  and	  one	  that	  discusses	  the	  attitude	  construct	  specifically,	  
Sherif	   &	   Hovland	   (1961)	   distinguish	   between	   latitutudes	   of	   acceptance,	   rejection	   and	  
noncommitment.	   These	   refer	   to	   the	   respective	   ranges	   which	   subjects	   find	   acceptable,	  
unacceptable,	  or	  about	  which	  they	  hold	  no	  firm	  opinion.	  Presented	  alternatives	  falling	  within	  
the	   latitude	  of	  acceptance	  are	  assimilated,	   those	   falling	  within	   the	   latitude	  of	   rejection	  are	  
contrasted,	   and	   those	   falling	   within	   the	   latitude	   of	   noncommitment	   receive	   a	   neutral	  
response.	  Moreover,	   Sherif	  &	  Hovland	   claim	   that	   this	   latitude	   structure	   is	   associated	  with	  
ego-­‐relatedness,	  that	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  issue	  applies	  to	  oneself.	  	  
	  
The	   tripartite	   typology	   characterizing	   mental	   outlooks	   has	   been	   reliably	   documented	   in	  
research	  findings.	  In	  the	  study	  of	  narrow-­‐mindedness,	  Rokeach	  (1951a,	  1951b)	  argued	  that	  
cognitive	  organisation	   that	  describes	  variable	  perspectives	   ranges	   from	  comprehensive,	   to	  
isolated,	  to	  narrow.	  A	  subject’s	  mental	  outlook	  was	  comprehensive	  if	  able	  to	  relate	  disparate	  
bits	  of	  information,	  isolated	  if	  broken	  down	  into	  substructures,	  and	  narrow	  if	  failing	  to	  relate	  
an	   entire	   series	   of	   concepts.	   Rokeach’s	   types	   are	   fashioned	   on	   Krech’s	   (1949)	   dynamic	  
systems	   model,	   which	   claims	   that	   systems	   vary	   in	   their	   propensity	   to	   relate	   to	   other	  
systems.	   According	   to	   Rokeach	   (1951a),	   the	   intensity	   of	   attitudes	   and	   their	   resistance	   to	  
change	   are	   a	   function	   of	   this	   underlying	   variable	   of	   cognitive	   organisation	   that	   describes	  
individuals’	   characteristic	   points	   of	   view.	   More	   recently,	   Sammut	   &	   Gaskell	   (2010)	   have	  
documented	   the	   same	   typology	   of	   points	   of	   view	   in	   their	   study	   of	   atheism	   and	   religious	  
belief.	   The	   authors	   argued	   that	   points	   of	   view	   varied	   according	   to	   individuals’	   relative	  
propensity	  to	  take	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  other.	  Other	  scholars	  have	  further	  documented	  this	  
typology	   in	   studies	   concerning	   immigration	   and	   rights	   of	   citizenship	   (Tsirogianni	   &	  
Andreouli,	  2011).	  
	  
Rokeach’s	   work	   has	   served	   as	   foundational	   for	   the	   study	   of	   open/closed-­‐mindedness	   in	  
psychology.	  More	  recently,	  the	  study	  of	  closed-­‐mindedness	  has	  been	  advanced	  by	  Kruglanski	  
(1989,	   2004).	   However,	   a	   critical	   problem	   inheres	   in	   this	   work	   that	   is	   also	   traceable	   to	  
Rokeach.	   Despite	   noting	   qualitative	   distinctions	   between	   the	   three	   types	   of	   cognitive	  
organization,	  Rokeach	  proceeded	  to	  collapse	  the	  measurement	  of	  this	  variable	  onto	  a	  single	  
quantitative	  continuum.	  The	  categorization	  of	  points	  of	  view	  in	  this	  measurement	  method	  is	  
problematic,	  as	  isolated	  and	  comprehensive	  organisers	  are	  able	  to	  entertain	  alternatives	  in	  a	  
manner	  which	  narrow	  organisers	   are	  not	   (see	   Sammut	  &	  Gaskell,	   2010).	   Consequently,	   in	  
recent	  works,	  the	  classification	  of	  points	  of	  view	  along	  these	  three	  types	  has	  been	  relegated	  
in	   favour	   of	   measuring	   a	   ‘need	   for	   cognitive	   closure’	   presumed	   to	   underlie	   closed-­‐
mindedness	   in	   turn	   (Kruglanski,	   2004;	   Manetti	   et	   al.,	   2002).	   We	   contend,	   however,	   that	  
whilst	   this	   line	  of	  research	   is	  highly	   important	   in	   its	  own	  right,	   the	  exclusive	  concern	  with	  
the	   need	   for	   cognitive	   closure	   has	   led	   to	   a	   dismissal	   of	   interest	   in	   open/closed-­‐minded	  
mental	  states,	  which	  in	  themselves	  are	  different	  psychological	  phenomena	  to	  the	  processes	  
that	  underpin	  them	  such	  as	  the	  need	  for	  cognitive	  closure.	  	  As	  Kruglanski	  notes,	  the	  two	  may	  
be	   associated	   but	   “the	   road	   leading	   from	   need	   for	   closure	   to	   close	   mindedness	   isn’t	   a	  
straightforward	  one”	  (2004,	  p.	  17).	  We	  thus	  return	  to	  this	  antiquarian	  (Billig,	  1987)	  debate,	  
warranted	  by	  recent	  critiques	  of	  methodological	  thinking	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  (see	  Toomela	  
&	   Valsiner,	   2010)	   and	   by	   recent	   advances	   in	   associated	   disciplines,	   namely	   stylistics	   and	  
critical	  linguistics	  (Simpson,	  1993),	  which	  have	  enabled	  a	  better	  operationalisation	  of	  points	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of	   view	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   characteristically	   variable	   rhetorical	   features.	  We	   argue	   that	   the	  
rehabilitation	   of	   this	   concept	   serves	   contemporary	   social	   research	   that	   seeks	   an	  
understanding	  of	  public	  opinion	  and	   the	  potential	   to	  entertain	  proposals	   for	  social	   change	  
better	   than	   attitude	   measures	   and	   the	   consideration	   of	   percentages	   reporting	   neutral	  
attitudes	  in	  a	  population.	  
	   	  
STUDY:	  THE	  REVISION	  OF	  STUDENT	  STIPENDS	  IN	  HIGHER	  EDUCATION	  IN	  MALTA	  	  
	  
Higher	   education	   institutions	   have	   served	   a	   key	   function	   in	   the	   advancement	   and	  
dissemination	  of	  knowledge	   for	  as	   long	  as	   they	  have	  existed.	  This	  end	   is	  achieved	  through	  
the	   undertaking	   of	   research	   and	   scholarly	   activity	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   teaching	   and	  
education	   of	   students	   in	   disciplinary	   frameworks	   on	   the	   other.	   In	   acquiring	   a	   tertiary	  
qualification,	   higher	   education	   students	   undertake	   an	   instructive	   process	   spanning	   a	  
number	  of	  years,	  during	  which	  they	  are	  meant	  to	  acquire	  specialist	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  that	  
the	   institution	   itself	   is	   engaged	   to	   advance.	   In	   this	   way,	   universities	   serve	   a	   latent	   social	  
purpose.	   Other	   than	   being	   repositories	   of	   knowledge,	   tertiary	   institutions	   also	   fulfill	   the	  
purpose	  of	  advancing	  and	  disseminating	  knowledge	  that	  serves	  society.	  	  
	  
The	  contemporary	  practice	  of	   funding	  research	  establishes	   this	  social	  purpose	   for	  modern	  
universities	   de	   facto.	   In	   addition,	   universities	   can	   serve	   further	   social	   functions.	   Primary	  
amongst	   these	   is	   the	   promotion	   of	   social	   mobility	   and	   the	   achievement	   of	   an	   egalitarian	  
society.	   In	   acquiring	   qualifications,	   individuals	   from	   deprived	   backgrounds	   are	   held	   to	  
acquire	  the	  potential	   to	  move	  up	  the	  social	   ladder	  and	  out	  of	  relative	  deprivation.	  Tertiary	  
qualifications	   thus	   constitute	   cultural	   capital	   (Bourdieu,	   1984)	   that	   can	   be	   exchanged	   for	  
better	  jobs,	  higher	  salaries,	  and	  a	  better	  quality	  of	  life.	  This	  opportunity	  afforded	  by	  tertiary	  
institutions	   presents	   itself	   in	   contradistinction	   to	   the	   feudal	   system	   of	   ascribed	   status,	  
assigned	  at	  birth,	  that	  permeates	  social	  inequalities	  throughout	  the	  lifespan.	  	  
	  
A	  key	  criterion	  for	  this	  added	  social	  function	  to	  be	  achieved,	  however,	  is	  that	  of	  equal	  access	  
to	  education.	  The	  problem	  of	  social	  status	  is	  endemic	  in	  the	  educational	  system,	  in	  that	  those	  
who	   command	   higher	   resources	   also	   command	   heightened	   possibilities	   for	   academic	  
success.	  The	  provision	  of	  higher	   education	   involves	  numerous	   costs,	   not	   least	   in	   servicing	  
teaching.	   In	  higher	  education,	  passing	  on	  this	  cost	  directly	  to	  the	  clientele	  means	  that	  only	  
those	  who	   command	   enough	   resources	   to	   afford	   the	   service	   at	   the	   outset	   become	   able	   to	  
improve	   their	   lot	   through	   its	   benefits.	   Many	   Western	   democracies	   have	   redressed	   this	  
anomaly	  through	  state	  incentives	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  equal	  opportunities	  and	  social	  mobility.	  
These	  include,	  for	  instance,	  the	  availability	  of	  scholarships	  and	  cheap	  loans	  to	  students	  from	  
disadvantaged	   socioeconomic	   backgrounds.	   Other	   societies	   have	   extended	   incentives	   yet	  
further	   by	   making	   tertiary	   education	   freely	   available	   to	   all	   at	   taxpayers’	   costs.	   Such	  
measures	  ensure	  not	  only	  equal	  opportunity,	  but	  also	  serve	   to	  create	  a	  knowledge	  society	  
where,	   over	   a	   number	   of	   generations,	   increasing	   numbers	   of	   citizens	   acquire	   a	   high-­‐level	  
education.	  This	  is	  held	  to	  be	  a	  desirable	  end	  in	  itself,	  as	  society	  develops	  a	  highly	  educated	  
workforce	  in	  every	  sphere	  of	  activity.	  The	  most	  far-­‐reaching	  measures	  have	  offered	  students	  
stipends	  as	  a	  monetary	  enticement	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  incentivise	  all	  capable	  of	  higher	  education	  
to	  undertake	  a	  tertiary	  qualification.	  Such,	  for	  instance,	  is	  the	  case	  in	  Malta.	  These	  incentives	  
serve	  the	  dual	  aims	  of	  individual	  social	  mobility	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  
knowledge-­‐based	  society	  on	  the	  other.	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These	   laudable	   aims	   have,	   however,	   recently	   been	   put	   into	   contestation.	   Various	  
governments	  in	  Europe	  have	  advanced	  the	  idea	  that	  hard	  times	  call	  for	  hard	  measures,	  and	  
that	  the	  socialist	  aims	  of	  easily	  accessible	  higher	  education	  require	  revision.	  These	  calls	  were	  
made	   on	   the	   back	   of	   an	   economic	   recession	   that	   hit	   the	   entire	   world,	   including	  Western	  
countries,	  in	  the	  closing	  years	  of	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  Governments	  in	  
certain	   European	   countries,	   such	   as	   Italy	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   adopted	   varying	  
measures	  to	  curb	  the	  state	  financing	  of	  tertiary	  institutions.	  A	  key	  argument	  sustaining	  these	  
revisions	  was	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  establishing	  a	  knowledge	  society	  had	  effectively	  been	  achieved	  
and	   that	   this,	   consequently,	   required	   no	   further	   impetus.	   Whilst	   many	   disagreed,	  
governments	   in	   both	   countries	   pushed	   forward	   revisions,	   instituting	   fewer	   and	   weaker	  
measures	  to	  support	  the	  state	  financing	  of	  higher	  education.	  	  
	  
Malta	  was	  not	  spared	  such	  controversy.	  The	  issue	  of	  revising	  the	  university	  stipend	  system	  
was	  originally	  put	  on	   the	  agenda	  by	   the	  Labour	  administration	  of	  1996,	  and	  attracted	  stiff	  
opposition	   from	   students	   and	   the	   general	   public	   alike.	   The	   matter	   was	   put	   to	   rest	   by	   a	  
premature	  change	   in	  government	   in	  1998.	   It	  was	  resurrected	   in	  2009	  by	  the	  Rector	  of	   the	  
University	  of	  Malta,	  who,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  reform	  in	  tertiary	  education,	  proposed	  that	  the	  
stipend	  system	  be	  revised	  and	  for	  the	  funds	  to	  be	  utilised	  towards	  further	  investment	  in	  the	  
sector.	  Rector’s	  suggestions	  were	  this	  time	  endorsed	  by	  other	  high-­‐ranking	  public	  officials,	  
but	  once	  again	  attracted	  stiff	  opposition.	  This	   time,	  however,	   the	  debate	  was	  arguably	   less	  
one-­‐sided,	  with	  a	  poll	  conducted	  by	  the	  university	  students’	  council	  suggesting	  that	  certain	  
students	   were	   also	   wanting	   the	   removal	   of	   stipends.	   The	   proposal	   received	   further	  
endorsement	   from	   a	   portion	   of	   the	   general	   public	   who	   expressed	   frustration	   at	   their	  
imposed	  taxation	  burden	  for	  financing	  others’	  studies.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  others,	  including	  
government,	   suggested	   that	   stipends	   remained	   an	   investment	   towards	   achieving	   a	  
knowledge-­‐society	  and	  useful	   in	  helping	  those	  who	   lack	   financial	  means	  to	  pursue	  tertiary	  
education.	  
	  
This	  context	  provided	  the	  socio-­‐political	  backdrop	  of	  the	  present	  study.	  Whilst	  the	  prevailing	  
method	  for	  the	  investigation	  of	  social	  issues	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  remains	  attitude	  research,	  
employing	   the	  much	  used	  Likert	   scale,	   the	  present	   study	   investigated	   the	   role	  of	  points	  of	  
view	   as	   a	   psychological	   variable	   in	   terms	   of	   individuals’	   cognitive	   capacity	   to	   appraise	   a	  
salient	  social	  issue.	  The	  study	  was	  undertaken	  with	  a	  sample	  of	  students	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Malta,	  all	  of	  whom	  presently	  receive	  stipends	  throughout	  their	  undergraduate	  studies.	  The	  
findings	  reported	  in	  this	  paper	  demonstrate	  that	  whilst	  attitude	  measures	  of	  these	  students	  
suggest	  a	  very	  strong	  public	  opinion	  against	  the	  revision	  of	  the	  stipends	  system,	  the	  analysis	  
of	  points	  of	  view	  reveals	  that	  this	  is	  far	  from	  a	  determined	  conclusion.	  Elsewhere	  (Sammut	  &	  
Gaskell,	   2010;	   2012;	   Sammut,	   2012),	   we	   have	   labeled	   the	   three	   point	   of	   view	   types	  
monological,	  dialogical,	   and	  metalogical.	  Monological	   points	  of	  view	  were	  demonstrated	   to	  
be	   exclusive	   and	   unable	   to	   consider	   an	   alternative	   point	   of	   view	   in	   their	   social	   judgment,	  
manifesting	   closed-­‐mindedness.	   Dialogical	   points	   of	   view	   were	   demonstrated	   to	   be	  
considerate	   but	   dismissive	   of	   an	   alternative,	   manifesting	   a	   bounded	   mental	   outlook.	  
Metalogical	  points	  of	  view	  were	  open	  and	  able	  to	  relate	  with	  an	  alternative	  according	  to	  the	  
alternative’s	   own	   background	   of	   intelligibility	   (Daanen,	   2009),	   manifesting	   open-­‐
mindedness.	   In	   their	   vast	   majority,	   respondents	   in	   this	   study	   demonstrate	   a	   cognitive	  
complexity	   that,	   whilst	   adopting	   a	   position	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   retention	   of	   stipends,	   is	  
nevertheless	  open-­‐minded	  and	  thus	  capable	  of	  dialogue	  with	  an	  alternative	  and	  potentially	  
less	  favourable	  position.	  
	  
	  





The	  tripartite	  distinction	  that	  inheres	  in	  points	  of	  view	  has	  been	  previously	  associated	  with	  
attitude	  intensity	  (Rokeach,	  1951a)	  and	  ego-­‐relatedness	  (Sherif	  &	  Hovland,	  1961),	  as	  noted	  
above.	  We	  therefore	  hypothesised	  that	  the	  more	  strongly	   individuals	  evaluated	  an	  attitude	  
statement	   (attitude	   intensity),	   the	   less	   predisposed	   they	   would	   be	   in	   relating	   with	   an	  
alternative	   perspective	   (point	   of	   view	   types).	  We	   expected	   that	   this	   would	   transpire	   in	   a	  
higher	   likelihood	   of	   adopting	   a	   closed,	   or	   monological,	   point	   of	   view.	   We	   further	  
hypothesised	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  ego-­‐relatedness,	  the	  less	  open-­‐minded	  their	  point	  of	  
view.	  We	  therefore	  expected	  variables	  to	  be	  correlated	  in	  two	  ways:	  (1)	  that	  point	  of	  view	  
types	  be	  correlated	  with	  attitude	  intensity;	  (2)	  that	  ego-­‐relatedness	  be	  correlated	  with	  point	  
of	  view	  types.	  	  
	  
Participants	  &	  Procedure	  
	  
A	  representative	  sample	  survey	  was	  undertaken	  with	  students	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Malta.	  A	  
questionnaire	  was	  emailed	   to	  a	  representative	  random	  sample	  of	  1000	  students,	   stratified	  
by	   faculty	   of	   studies,	   through	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   Registrar	   in	   November	   2009.	   Three	   email	  
reminders	   were	   subsequently	   sent	   during	   the	   following	   three	   months.	   The	   survey	   was	  
closed	   in	   February	   2010.	  At	   the	   time	   of	   closure,	   the	   survey	   attracted	   247	   fully	   completed	  
questionnaires.	   The	   survey	   thus	   attracted	   an	   effective	   response	   rate	   of	   24.7%	   (N=247),	  
which	   is	  deemed	   satisfactory	   for	   an	  online	   survey.	  The	  distribution	  of	   respondents	   across	  




The	  questionnaire	  was	  presented	  in	  two	  parts.	  The	  first	  page	  of	  the	  questionnaire	  presented	  
a	  series	  of	  five	  statements	  to	  which	  respondents	  were	  required	  to	  react	  on	  a	  five-­‐point	  Likert	  
scale	   ranging	   from	   totally	  disagree	   to	   totally	   agree	  as	   a	  measure	  of	   attitude	   intensity.	  The	  
statements	   were	   selected	   from	   articles	   and	   comments	   published	   by	   the	   Times	   of	   Malta	  
regarding	  the	  issue	  of	  stipends,	  and	  were	  selected	  in	  view	  of	  their	  linguistic	  characteristics	  
that	   conform	   to	   the	   rhetorical	   strategies	  of	   different	  point	   of	   view	   types	   (Simpson,	   1993),	  
detailed	  above.	  
	  
The	   first	   statement	   [“Stipends	  are	  a	  privilege	  not	  a	   right,	   and	  one	   that	   the	   country	   cannot	  
afford.	  Students	  in	  Malta	  are	  already	  lucky	  to	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  tuition	  fees,	  so	  stipends	  should	  
be	  removed”]	  and	  the	  second	  statement	  [“Stipends	  are	  a	  necessity.	  Stipends	  are	  for	  everyone	  
because	   everyone	  has	   a	   right	   to	   education,	   so	   stipends	  must	  be	  untouched”]	  were	  high	   in	  
deontic	  modal	  terms	  (Simpson,	  1993)	  that	  indicate	  an	  obligation,	  duty,	  or	  commitment	  to	  a	  
particular	  position.	  	  
	  
The	   third	   [“It	   is	   important	   for	   the	   stipend	   system	   to	   be	   sustainable	   and	   not	   hinder	  
investment	   in	  quality	  education,	  whilst	   also	  assisting	   those	   in	  need.	  However,	   revising	   the	  
system	   might	   mean	   not	   all	   will	   continue	   to	   receive	   a	   stipend”]	   as	   well	   as	   the	   fourth	  
statements	   [“Whilst	   certain	   students	   do	   not	   need	   stipends	   and	   they	   spend	   their	  monthly	  
allocation	  on	  non-­‐essentials,	  for	  others	  the	  stipend	  is	  the	  only	  way	  they	  can	  afford	  university.	  
It	   is	   important	   that	   some	   form	   of	   the	   stipend	   system	  be	   retained”]	   included	   an	   epistemic	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rhetoric	   that	   distinguishes	   non-­‐categorical	   from	   categorical	   assertions	   by	   signaling	   a	  
qualified	   commitment	   to	   the	   truth,	   or	   validity,	   of	   an	   utterance.	   These	   epistemic	   terms	  
validated	  an	  opposing	  social	  position,	  but	  the	  argument	  retained	  a	  deontic	  position.	  	  
	  
The	   argument	  presented	   in	   the	   fifth	   statement	   [“Stipends	  provide	   students	  with	   spending	  
money.	   Some	  students	  benefit	   from	  stipends	  as	   they	  do	  not	  have	  other	  means	  of	   financial	  
support.	  Other	  students	  spend	  their	  stipends	  on	  luxuries.	  The	  stipend	  system	  should	  ensure	  
that	  the	   funds	  allocated	  for	  stipends	  support	  needy	  students	  and	  are	  a	  good	  investment	   in	  
higher	  education”]	  was	  epistemic	  and	  open-­‐ended	   in	   rhetorical	   form,	  and	  unassuming	  any	  
particular	  deontic	  position1.	  	  
	  
Following	   the	   rating	   of	   these	   five	   arguments	   on	   a	   Likert	   scale	   (i.e.	   attitude	   intensity),	  
respondents	  were	  requested	  to	  choose	  the	  one	  that	  comes	  closest	  to	  their	  own	  view.	  In	  this	  
way,	  respondents	  self-­‐classified	  their	  point	  of	  view	  type.	  The	  first	  (against	  the	  issue)	  and	  the	  
second	  (for	  the	  issue)	  statements	  were	  considered	  monological,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  
presented	   a	   unilinear	   argument	   that	   does	   not	   concede	   alternatives	   any	   valid	   ground.	   The	  
third	  (against	  the	  issue)	  and	  the	  fourth	  (for	  the	  issue)	  statements	  were	  deemed	  dialogical,	  in	  
view	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   acknowledged	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   an	   alternative	   position	   but	  
proceeded	  to	  stand	  against	   it	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  different	  argument.	  The	  fifth	  statement	  was	  
deemed	  metalogical	  in	  view	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  voiced	  different	  positions	  and	  conceded	  equal	  
legitimacy	  to	  all	  of	  them.	  This	  method	  of	  vignette	  selection	  has	  been	  reliably	  used	  in	  much	  
research	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   characterized	   by	   diversity	   of	   opinions	   and	   multicultural	  
issues	  (see	  Georgas	  &	  Papastylianou,	  1998).	  
	  
Following	  the	  presentation	  of	  statements	  requesting	  respondents	  to	  quantify	  their	  attitudes	  
towards	   the	   statements	   in	   the	   first	   instance	   and	   to	   self-­‐classify	   their	   points	   of	   view	  
accordingly	   in	   the	   second	   instance,	   a	   measure	   of	   ego-­‐relatedness	   was	   presented	   to	  
respondents	   asking	   them	   to	   rate	   the	   extent	   of	   how	   important	   the	   issue	   was	   to	   them	  
personally	  ranging	  from	  1	  (lowest)	  to	  10	  (highest).	  This	  measure	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  adopted	  
by	   Sherif	   &	   Hovland	   (1961)	   in	   their	   study	   of	   ego-­‐relatedness.	   Demographic	   data	   for	  




Distribution	  of	  Attitudes	  and	  Points	  of	  View	  
	  
Responses	   for	   the	   first	   statement	   were	   positively	   skewed	   with	   most	   students	   expressing	  
themselves	   against	   this	   statement.	   Responses	   to	   the	   second	   statement	   demonstrated	   an	  
opposite	   trend,	  with	  most	   students	  expressing	   themselves	   in	   favour	  of	   this	   statement	   in	  a	  
negatively	   skewed	   distribution.	   The	   third	   statement	   received	   a	   different	   response.	  
Responses	   for	   the	   third	   statement	   were	   negatively	   skewed	   and	   the	   distribution	   was	  
platykurtic,	   with	   most	   students	   agreeing	   with	   this	   statement.	   Responses	   to	   the	   fourth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Whilst	  the	  last	  clause	  of	  this	  argument	  appears	  deontic	  in	  mandating	  a	  certain	  purpose	  for	  the	  use	  of	  stipends,	  
this	  is	  considered	  as	  not	  the	  case	  in	  view	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  recommendation	  made	  is	  already	  in	  place.	  Students	  
receive	  restricted	  use	  lump-­‐sum	  payments	  that	  can	  only	  be	  spent	  at	  certain	  outlets	  and	  towards	  the	  purchase	  
of	   certain	  products	   that	   are	   deemed	   relevant	   for	   the	  purposes	   of	   higher	   education.	   Students	   receive	   further	  
regular	  and	  unrestricted	  contributions	  that	  cover	  little	  more	  than	  transport	  costs	  to	  university.	  Consequently,	  
this	  argument	  can	  be	  used	  to	  support	  the	  present	  system	  as	  is,	  as	  much	  as	  argue	  for	  revisions.	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statement	   were	   also	   negatively	   skewed,	   but	   the	   distribution	   was	   leptokurtic,	   with	   most	  
students	  expressing	  themselves	  very	  strongly	  in	  favour	  of	  this	  statement.	  Finally,	  responses	  
to	  the	  fifth	  statement	  were	  negatively	  skewed	  and	  the	  distribution	  was	   leptokurtic	   for	  this	  
variable	  also	  (Tables	  1,	  2).	  
	  
Following	   the	   Likert-­‐type	   rating	   for	   each	   of	   these	   statements,	   respondents	  were	   asked	   to	  
choose	   the	  one	  statement	   that	  came	  closest	   to	   their	  own	  views.	  This	  measure	  enabled	   the	  
self-­‐classification	  of	   respondents’	   points	   of	   view.	  When	   choosing	   their	   own	  points	   of	   view	  
from	  amongst	  the	  range	  of	  presented	  stimuli,	  8	  respondents	  (3.2%)	  chose	  the	  first	  statement	  
as	   coming	   closest	   to	   their	   own	  view,	   43	   (17.4%)	   chose	   the	   second	   statement,	   27	   (10.9%)	  
chose	   the	   third	   statement,	   108	   (43.7%)	   chose	   the	   fourth,	   and	   61	   (24.7%)	   chose	   the	   fifth	  
statement	  as	  coming	  closest	  to	  their	  own	  views.	  These	  responses	  were	  recoded	  into	  points	  
of	  view.	  Responses	  for	  the	  first	  and	  second	  statements	  were	  combined	  as	  monological	  points	  
of	  view,	   responses	   for	   the	   third	  and	   fourth	  responses	  were	  recoded	  as	  dialogical	  points	  of	  
view,	  and	  responses	  for	  the	  fifth	  variable	  were	  recoded	  as	  metalogical.	   In	  these	  categories,	  
51	   respondents	   (20.6%)	   demonstrated	   a	   monological	   point	   of	   view,	   135	   (54.7%)	  
demonstrated	  a	  dialogical	  point	  of	  view,	  and	  61	  (24.7%)	  demonstrated	  a	  metalogical	  point	  of	  
view.	  Responses	   for	   the	  ego-­‐relatedness	  variable	  were	  negatively	   skewed	  on	  a	   leptokurtic	  
distribution	  (see	  table	  1).	  	  
	  
Table	  1.	  
Distribution	  of	  Attitudes	  Regarding	  Point	  of	  View	  Statements	  
	  
	   Strongly	  Disagree	   Disagree	   Neither/Nor	   Agree	   Strongly	  Agree	   Total	  
f	   %	   f	   %	   f	   %	   f	   %	   f	   %	   N	   %	  
Statement	  1	   122	   49.4	   56	   22.7	   48	   19.4	   17	   6.9	   4	   1.6	   247	   100	  
Statement	  2	   8	   3.2	   24	   9.7	   40	   16.2	   62	   25.1	   113	   45.7	   247	   100	  
Statement	  3	   18	   7.3	   33	   13.4	   77	   31.2	   69	   27.9	   50	   20.2	   247	   100	  
Statement	  4	   3	   1.2	   4	   1.6	   20	   8.1	   48	   19.4	   172	   69.6	   247	   100	  
Statement	  5	   4	   1.6	   18	   7.3	   33	   13.4	   78	   31.6	   114	   46.2	   247	   100	  
	  
Table	  2.	  
Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  Point	  of	  View	  Statements	  
	  
	  
Mean	   Std.	  Deviation	   Skewness	   Kurtosis	  
Statistic	   Statistic	   Statistic	   Std.	  Error	   Statistic	   Std.	  Error	  
Statement	  1	   1.89	   1.049	   .931	   .155	   -­‐.067	   .309	  
Statement	  2	   4.00	   1.142	   -­‐.932	   .155	   -­‐.125	   .309	  
Statement	  3	   3.40	   1.164	   -­‐.336	   .155	   -­‐.623	   .309	  
Statement	  4	   4.55	   .810	   -­‐2.052	   .155	   4.420	   .309	  
Statement	  5	   4.13	   1.009	   -­‐1.084	   .155	   .485	   .309	  
Ego-­‐relatedness	   8.37	   2.085	   -­‐1.473	   .155	   1.671	   .309	  
	  
	  
Relationships	  between	  Attitudes,	  Point	  of	  View	  types,	  and	  Ego-­Relatedness	  
	  
Responses	   to	   the	   various	   attitude	   statements	   demonstrated	   cognitive	   organization.	  
Responses	  to	  the	  first	  statement	  were	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  responses	  to	  the	  second	  
statement	   (r	   =	   -­‐.664,	   p<0.01),	   to	   the	   third	   statement	   (r	   =	   .374,	   p<0.01),	   and	   to	   the	   fifth	  
statement	   (r	   =	   -­‐.485,	   p<0.01).	   These	   correlations	  were	   also	   in	   the	   expected	   direction	   (i.e.	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statements	  1	  and	  3	  against	  the	  revision	  of	  stipends,	  and	  statements	  2	  and	  4	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  
revision).	  Responses	  to	  the	  second	  statement	  were	  further	  correlated	  with	  responses	  to	  the	  
third	  statement	  (r	  =	  -­‐.344,	  p<0.01)	  and	  the	  fifth	  statement	  (r	  =	  .535,	  p<0.01),	  which	  is	  also	  in	  
the	  expected	  direction.	  Responses	  to	  the	  third	  statement	  were	  further	  correlated	  positively	  
with	  responses	  to	  the	  fourth	  statement	  (r	  =	  .174,	  p<0.01)	  and	  negatively	  with	  the	  fifth	  (r	  =	  -­‐
.344,	  p<0.01).	  The	  positive	  correlation	  between	  the	  third	  and	  the	  fourth	  statements	  violated	  
expectations,	  seeing	  that	   the	   latter	  statement	  takes	  a	  position	   in	   favour	  of	  reform	  whereas	  
the	   former	   seeks	   to	   preserve	   aspects	   of	   the	   present	   system.	   The	   fourth	   statement	   in	  
particular	   seems	   to	   present	   anomalous	   findings	   throughout	   and	   is	   deemed	   to	   require	  
revision	  in	  future	  research.	  This	  is	  considered	  a	  limitation	  in	  the	  accurate	  representation	  of	  
student	  views	  towards	  stipend	  reform.	  However,	  this	  limitation	  does	  not	  detract	  the	  analysis	  
of	   the	   relations	   between	   psychological	   variables	   that	   constituted	   the	   primary	   aim	   of	   this	  
study.	  
	  
As	  detailed	  above,	  responses	  to	  the	  attitude	  statements	  indicated	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  issue	  to	  
respondents	  in	  both	  the	  skewness	  of	  responses	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  attitude	  variables	  
in	  the	  sample.	  A	  measure	  of	  ego-­‐relatedness	  was	  adopted	  to	  investigate	  this	  level	  of	  salience.	  
Ego-­‐relatedness	  was	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  responses	  on	  the	  first	  statement	  (r	  =	  -­‐.393,	  
p<0.01),	  the	  second	  statement	  (r	  =	  .435,	  p<0.01),	  the	  third	  statement	  (r	  =	  -­‐.296,	  p<0.01),	  and	  
the	   fifth	   statement	   (r	   =	   .349,	   p<0.01).	   This	   measure	   was	   not	   correlated	   with	   the	   fourth	  
statement	  (r	  =	  .003,	  p=0.962).	  	  
	  
As	  noted	  earlier,	  theorists	  have	  argued	  that	  cognitive	  organisation	  is	  associated	  with	  attitude	  
intensity	  and	  resistance	  to	  change.	  Considering	  the	  various	  significant	  correlations	  between	  
attitude	   statements	   and	   ego-­‐relatedness,	   it	  was	   reasonable	   to	   expect	   that	   ego-­‐relatedness	  
demonstrate	   a	   similar	   correlation	   with	   point	   of	   view	   types.	   This	   tested	   our	   second	  
hypothesis,	  as	  detailed	  above.	  The	  relationship	  between	  ego-­‐relatedness	  and	  points	  of	  view,	  
however,	  was	  not	  significant	  (r	  =	  -­‐.043,	  p=0.506).	  	  
	  
Table	  3.	  
Correlations	  Between	  Statements	  1-­5	  and	  Point	  of	  View	  Type	  
	  
	   	   Point	  of	  View	  Type	  
Statement	  1	   Pearson	  Correlation	   -­‐.028	  
Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	   .662	  
N	   247	  
Statement	  2	   Pearson	  Correlation	   -­‐.042	  
Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	   .506	  
N	   247	  
Statement	  3	   Pearson	  Correlation	   -­‐.078	  
Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	   .222	  
N	   247	  
Statement	  4	   Pearson	  Correlation	   .041	  
Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	   .519	  
N	   247	  
Statement	  5	   Pearson	  Correlation	   .195**	  
Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	   .002	  
N	   247	  
	  
Finally,	   the	   relationship	   between	   points	   of	   view	   and	   the	   various	   attitude	   statements	   was	  
investigated	   (table	   3).	   This	   tested	   our	   first	   hypothesis,	   as	   detailed	   above.	   All	   of	   the	  
	  
Psychology	  &	  Society,	  2013,	  Vol.	  5	  (1),	  54	  -­‐	  66	   63	  
correlations	  between	  attitude	  statements	  and	  point	  of	  view	  types	  were	  not	  significant	  except	  




The	   findings	   of	   this	   study	   demonstrate	   that	   students	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Malta	   are	  
overwhelmingly	   against	   the	   removal	   of	   the	   stipends	   and	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   retention	  of	   this	  
system	   in	   one	   form	   or	   another.	   For	   every	   statement	   presented,	   students’	   aggregate	  
responses	  were	  mostly	  skewed	  and	  peaked	  in	  favour	  of	  stipend	  provision.	  Very	  few	  indeed	  
agree	   that	   stipends	   should	   be	   removed	   outrightly.	   Moreover,	   students	   feel	   very	   strongly	  
about	  this	  issue	  and	  that	  it	  applies	  to	  them	  quite	  strongly.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising,	  considering	  
the	  material	  way	   in	  which	  this	   issue	  applies	   to	   the	  population	  under	  study.	   In	  many	  ways,	  
such	   findings	   would	   represent	   the	   prevailing	   aspiration	   of	   much	   social	   research	   that	  
measures	  and	  presents	  attitudinal	  findings	  in	  various	  statistical	  forms.	  All	  in	  all,	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	   responses	   to	   attitude	   statements	   alone,	   one	   would	   be	   justified	   in	   concluding	   that	   any	  
alternative	  proposition	   to	   reform	  the	  stipend	  system	  will	  be	  met	  by	  stiff	   resistance	  on	   the	  
part	  of	  students.	  	  
	  
However,	   in	   this	  study,	  whilst	   responses	   to	   the	  attitude	  statements	  were	  characteristically	  
skewed,	   the	  same	  was	  not	  true	  of	  points	  of	  view.	   If	  anything,	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	  students	  
were	  not	  monological	  with	  regards	   to	   this	  social	   issue,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   this	  applies	   to	  
them	  in	  a	  very	  material	  way,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  also	  feel	  very	  strongly	  about	   it,	  and	  
despite	  the	  fact	  that	  alternative	  propositions	  were	  mostly	  regarded	  as	  unfavourable.	  	  
	  
We	  expected	  that	  the	  more	  strongly	  students	  evaluated	  attitude	  statements	  and	  the	  higher	  
their	  level	  of	  ego-­‐relatedness,	  the	  less	  predisposed	  they	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  in	  relating	  with	  
an	  alternative	  proposition.	  In	  the	  affirmative	  of	  this	  hypothesis,	  it	  ought	  to	  have	  transpired	  
as	  a	  higher	  likelihood	  of	  adopting	  a	  monological	  point	  of	  view.	  We	  therefore	  expected	  these	  
variables	  to	  be	  correlated	  in	  two	  ways:	  (1)	  that	  points	  of	  view	  should	  be	  correlated	  with	  the	  
attitude	  statements	  themselves.	  This	  would	  have	  meant	  that	  the	  more	  open	  the	  outlook,	  the	  
less	   extreme	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   attitude	   statements.	   The	   findings	   demonstrated	   no	  
correlation	   between	   points	   of	   view	   and	   four	   out	   of	   the	   five	   attitude	   variables.	   	   We	   also	  
hypothesised	  (2)	  that	  ego-­‐relatedness	  would	  be	  associated	  with	  points	  of	  view,	  considering	  
that	   ego-­‐relatedness	   was	   found	   to	   be	   significantly	   correlated	   in	   most	   cases	   with	   the	  
individual	   attitude	   statements.	   Both	   of	   these	   hypotheses	   were	   reasonable	   in	   view	   of	   the	  
prevailing	  presumption	  that	  cognitive	  organisation	  determines	  attitude	  intensity.	  	  
	  
Both	  of	  our	  hypotheses	  were	  unsupported	  by	  the	  data.	  Ego-­‐relatedness	  was	  not	  found	  to	  be	  
correlated	  with	  points	  of	  view.	  This	  suggests	  that	  whilst	  the	  more	  strongly	  one	  feels	  that	  the	  
issue	  applies	  to	  oneself	  (i.e.	  ego-­‐relatedness)	  the	  more	  extreme	  one’s	  attitudes	  regarding	  the	  
issue,	  how	  strongly	  one	  feels	  about	  the	  issue	  and	  however	  extreme	  one’s	  attitude	  might	  be	  
is,	   in	   most	   cases,	   not	   related	   to	   one’s	   variable	   capacity	   to	   relate	   with	   the	   perspective	   of	  
another.	   That	   is	   to	   say	   that	   feeling	   strongly	   towards	   some	   issue	   does	   not	   short-­‐circuit	  
cognition	  into	  adopting	  a	  monological	  mindset.	  Students	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Malta	  were	  able	  
to	   retain	   an	   open	   mind	   in	   their	   judgment	   of	   alternative	   propositions,	   even	   if	   they	  
subjectively	  disagreed	  with	  these	  propositions	  very	  strongly.	  
	  
This	   is	  a	  seemingly	  straightforward	  conclusion	  derived	  from	  the	   findings	  of	   this	  study,	  but	  
one	  that	  bears	  very	  significant	  implications	  for	  social	  research.	  It	  means	  that,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	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attitude	   measures	   alone,	   one	   is	   unable	   to	   draw	   conclusions	   as	   to	   whether	   individuals’	  
articulated	  positions	  are	  definitive.	   In	  mainstream	  attitude	  research,	   the	  more	  extreme	  the	  
attitude	   expressed,	   the	  more	   definitive	   the	   conclusion	  made	   about	   the	   attitude.	   The	   ones	  
that	  are	  held	  to	  be	  open	  to	  negotiation	  are	  traditionally	  the	  ones	  that	  fall	  in	  the	  grey	  area	  of	  
neither	  agree	  nor	  disagree	  (see	  Wagoner	  &	  Valsiner,	  2005).	  These	  respondents	  are	  held	  to	  
not	  have	  made	  their	  minds	  up	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  issue,	  and	  to	  thus	  stand	  to	  be	  convinced	  
one	   way	   or	   the	   other.	   In	   political	   opinion	   polls,	   for	   instance,	   these	   are	   traditionally	  
considered	  to	  be	  ‘floating	  voters’	  who	  could,	  without	  prior	  notice,	  tip	  the	  balance	  one	  way	  or	  
another	   by	   joining	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	   agree	   or	   disagree.	   Conversely,	   the	   more	   strongly	  
individuals	   agree	   or	   disagree	  with	   the	   presented	   stimulus,	   that	   is	   the	   higher	   the	   attitude	  
strength,	   the	   less	   likely	   they	   are	   held	   to	   change	   their	   attitude	   in	   response	   to	   persuasive	  
appeals	  (Eagly	  &	  Chaiken,	  1993).	  	  
	  
The	  findings	  reported	  above	  suggest	  that	  these	  conclusions	  may	  be	  erroneous.	  It	  seems	  that	  
how	  strongly	  individuals	  feel	  about	  some	  issue	  does	  not	  deter	  their	  capacity	  to	  relate	  to	  an	  
alternative	  perspective.	  It	  is	  this	  capacity,	  rather	  than	  expressed	  evaluation	  of	  some	  attitude	  
statement,	   that	   determines	   their	   propensity	   to	   dialogue	   and,	   as	   a	   function	   of	   dialogue,	   to	  
change	  their	  original	  position	  to	  reconcile	  it	  with	  the	  perspective	  of	  another.	  In	  other	  words,	  
it	   is	   this	   cognitive	  operation	   that	  determines	  whether	   individuals	   stand	   to	  be	   corrected	   in	  
their	   views	   through	   dialogue,	   rather	   than	   their	   indecisiveness	   to	   agree	   or	   disagree	   with	  
some	  attitude	   statement	  at	   a	  particular	  point	   in	   time.	  Attitude	   research	  has	  neglected	   this	  
argumentative	  and	  relational	  aspect	  of	  having	  a	  point	  of	  view	  (Billig,	  1987,	  1991).	  It	  is	  only	  
in	  monological	  cases	  that	  views	  are	  determined,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  views	  are	  closed	  by	  
their	   very	   nature	   to	   any	   opportunity	   for	   dialogue	   and	   relating	   with	   an	   alternative.	   In	  
monological	  points	  of	  view,	  the	  alternative	  is	  not	  legitimated	  and	  thus	  dismissed	  without	  a	  
hearing.	   Such	   closure	   detracts	   the	   opportunity	   of	   influence,	   meaning	   that	   for	   such	  
individuals	  the	  prospect	  of	  persuasion	  is	  unlikely.	  Yet,	  even	  with	  regards	  to	  an	  issue	  about	  
which	  respondents	  felt	  very	  strongly,	  as	  in	  the	  present	  case,	  attitude	  intensity	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  deter	  the	  individual	  from	  dialogue,	  and	  insofar	  as	  the	  individual	  is	  open	  
to	   dialogue,	   then	   that	   same	   individual	   stands	   to	   be	   persuaded	   otherwise.	  Human	   subjects	  
can	  feel	  very	  strongly	  about	  particular	  issues	  due	  to	  the	  relevance	  these	  might	  have	  in	  their	  
lives,	   but,	   as	   the	   findings	   of	   this	   study	   demonstrate,	   they	   retain	   cognitive	   complexity	   to	  




The	   findings	   of	   this	   study	   offer	   hope	   and	   promise	   for	   dialogue.	   The	   present	   study	  
demonstrates	   that	   even	  when	   individuals’	   attitudes	   are	   highly	   predisposed	   for	   or	   against	  
some	   alternative,	   most	   retain	   a	   capacity	   for	   dialogue	   and	   thus	   stand	   to	   be	   convinced	  
otherwise.	  Whilst	  research	  on	  closed-­‐mindedness	  demonstrates	  that	   the	  ability	  to	  take	  the	  
perspective	  of	  another	  is	  a	  psychological	  variable	  and	  by	  no	  means	  a	  given	  of	  adult	  human	  
cognition,	  this	  study	  demonstrates	  that	  need	  for	  closure	  (Kruglanski,	  2004)	  is	  less	  perverse	  
than	  what	  one	  might	  presume.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  attitude	  data,	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  present	  case,	  
one	  might	  have	  been	  justified	  in	  concluding	  that	  the	  student	  population	  is	  unable	  to	  engage	  
in	  dialogical	  relations	  towards	  a	  solution	  for	  the	  funding	  of	  higher	  education.	  The	  findings	  of	  
this	   study,	  however,	  demonstrate	   that	   this	   is	   a	  hasty	   conclusion.	  This	  paper	  demonstrates	  
that	  with	  regards	  to	  human	  social	  cognition,	  there	  is	  more	  than	  meets	  the	  attitudinal	  eye.	  A	  
deeper	   appreciation	   of	   the	   positions	   that	   individuals	   are	   ready	   to	   negotiate	   and	   take	   up	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requires	   sensitivity	   to	   situational	   aspects	   of	   the	   issue	   and	   awareness	   of	   the	   dialogical	  
potential	  of	  human	  social	  cognition.	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